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I.

STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this ippeal

pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(f).
II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW.
A.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Congress did
not preempt the State of Utah ("State") from requiring
the payment of Utah property taxes on boats as a
condition for the defendants enjoying the waters of
Lake Powell within the exterior boundaries of the
GCNRA?

B.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the payment
of property taxes on boats whose payment would be
significantly more than what the Coast Guard would
charge and much more than the cost of using Y -its in
surrounding states as a precondition for the
defendants' use of Lake Powell and the waters within
the GCNRA, does not impermissibly interfere with
interstate commerce?

C.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW.
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases

are reviewed for correctness.

State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,

1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah
1991).

Utah cases teach that "correctness" means that the

appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer
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in any degree to the trial court's determination of law.
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
D.

RECORD SUPPORTING THE PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE.

E.

GROUND FOR SEEKING REVIEW OF AN ISSUE NOT PRESERVED AT
TRIAL COURT.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE DETERMINATION IS DETERMINATIVE.
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18
United States Constitution, Article VI
Utah Boating Act, U.C.A. § 73-18-7
Utah Property Tax Act, U.C.A. § 59-2-301
Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. and 13101
et seq.
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area Act, 86 Stat. 1311
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This is an appeal from the decision of the district court

denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the citations against
them issued by an agent of the State of Utah, Department of
Natural Resources, Division of Parks and Recreation ("State" or
"the Division").

The citations charged that the defendants

violated U.C.A. § 73-18-7(1), by failing to register their boats
with an agency of the State.

The trial judge held that the

defendants failed to persuade the court that Congress intended to

PICKETT\fcLEADING\Bnef. UCA

~^~

divest the State generally of its power to enforce state laws
within the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area ("GCNRA").
Further, the court held that the State did not violate the
Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by
imposing its property tax upon the defendants as a condition of
the defendants using their boats within the GCNRA.

This appeal

seeks to reverse the decision of the district court and seeks a
declaration that the State does not have jurisdiction over
persons and their property within the exterior boundaries of the
GCNRA, to the extent that such persons and their property are
engaged in recreation activities and other activities for which
the GCNRA has been created and used.

The defendants each entered

a conditional plea of no contest to the charges, for the purpose
of preserving all issues pertaining to jurisdiction and with the
understanding that defendants preserve the right to withdraw
their plea if they are successful on appeal.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.
Congress has enacted a series of laws that extensively

govern activities occurring within the Colorado River corridor
and within the GCNRA, and the federal executive departments have
promulgated extensive, detailed and broadly applied regulations,
that cumulatively have displaced and preempted the operation of
state laws within the GCNRA, including the boat registration
laws.
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The Division and the county assessors of those counties that
include portions of Lake Powell are enforcing the Utah Boating
Act and the Utah Property Tax Act in a manner that requires the
defendants to pay the Utah property tax on their boats before
either of the defendants will be issued a boat registration
number.

The cost of registering the defendants' boats in Utah

far exceed the cost of registration of the same boats in the
states of their residence or with the Coast Guard.

The State's

boat registration law, as implemented, in effect interferes with
the rights of the defendants arising under the United States
Constitution at Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 in that the tax
has no substantial nexus to the activities of the State within
the GCNRA, and is not fairly related to services provided by the
State.
VI.

ARGUMENT.
A.

BACKGROUND FACTS.
The GCNRA is a component of a series of water projects

within the Colorado River system.

The Colorado River is an

intensely federally regulated river whose water is heavily
depended upon by seven western states and Mexico.

Congress has

enacted numerous laws directed at the River, including the
Colorado River Compact of 1922, U.C.A. § 73-12a-2, the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057, the Mexican Water Treaty,
Treaty Series 994, 59 Stat. 1219, the Act of August 30, 1935
(Parker Dam), the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act of 1940,
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54 Stat. 774, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1949,
63 Stat. 31, the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956,
52 Stc . 31, the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968,
82 Stat. 885, and the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area Act of
1972, 86 Stat. 1311.

To meet the River's obligations to these

states and Mexico, Congress enacted as series of laws that (1)
allocate water among the upper and lower basin states, (2)
authorize various water projects, (3) assure a minimum flow into
Mexico, and (4) authorize water storage and water use for
navigation, electrical power, irrigation, recreation, and other
interstate uses.
The water stored behind the Glen Canyon Dam at the
southern end of the upper basin within Lake Powell is stored for
the use of the lower basin states and Mexico as those waters are
needed by them.

72 U.S. Code C^ng. and Adm. News, p. 4919.

In

1972, Congress created the GCNRA to take recreational and scenic
advantage of the 200 miles of lake reservoir that follows the
Colorado River upstream.

As a result of the mandate of the Utah

Schools and Lands Improvement Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 995, and the
GCNRA Act, the GCNRA is or soon will be totally comprised of
federal land.
p. 4921.

Also, see 72 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News,

The GCNRA is totally isolated from non-federal lands by

adjacent blocks of national monuments, national parks, public
domain and Indian lands.
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On these federally owned lands and waters within the
GCNRA, congressionally authorized activities are managed by
federal agencies:

(1) operation of the Glen Canyon Dam by the

Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") in accordance with an integrated
plan for the entire river; (2) operation of the land and water
areas as a national park and recreation area by the National Park
Service ("NPS"); and (3) operation of federal lands in accordance
with the Federal Land Management Policy Act and other federal
land statutes.

1972 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 4919.

Congress designed the GCNRA as a multiple-use area where
recreation is given top billing with electrical power generation,
irrigation, water storage, and other important national goals.
Id.

The BOR and NPS have divided the Department of the

Interior's activities primarily between them with the BOR being
responsible for the dam's operation and maintenance and the NPS
being responsible for the remainder of the GCNRA's operations.
Id.
According to Section 8 of the GCNRA Act, access to the
recreational services within the GCNRA consists of the United
States Department of Transportation ("DOT") providing road access
to the principal land areas within the GCNRA land areas and Lake
Powell and NPS providing road access in the other areas within
the GCNRA.

How the land is used is extensively regulated by

Interior agencies.

How the water surface is used is extensively

regulated by both NPS and DOT'S Coast Guard.
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The GCNRA is a self-contained community where principal
services are either directly provided by federal agencies or
indirectly provided by NPS's concessioner.

Such services include

those that are within the traditional police powers of a state.
See United States v. Smith, 713 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1983).
Nominal services are provided by the state and local governments
whom are either directly reimbursed or whom are indirectly
reimbursed through congressional appropriations as payments in
lieu of taxes.

The trial court characterized the federal

regulation of activities within the GCNRA as "extensive, even
pervasive."

[Record at p. 166].

The Bullfrog Marina operated by the concessioner offers
overnight lodging, restaurants, campgrounds, and even an
airstrip, in addition to the marina and other lake-related
facilities and services.

ae concessioner also operates three

other marinas with varying degrees of service in accordance with
contracts with the NPS.
people visited the GCNRA.

In 1973, approximately 1.2 million
By 1983, these numbers had increased

to two million, with most visitors entering by way of Arizona
highways.

Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F.Supp. 594, 597, n.4

(D. Utah 1987).

In 1991, visitor usage increased to

approximately three million.

The GCNRA arguably is "the most

heavily visited of all the areas in the interior West managed by
the NPS, receiving more visitors each year than the Grand Canyon,
more even than Yellowstone."
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the Soul of the West, Russell Martin, Henry Holt and Company,
Inc., 1989, p. 6.
The defendants are non-Utah residents whose only
contacts within the State occur within the self-contained GCNRA
community, principally at Lake Powell where they have maintained
their recreational boats since the early 1980s (R. 2) .

Each

defendant has obtained boat registration permits from other
states that include identification information that has been
publicly displayed on their boats (R. 2) . The cost of boat
registration in the defendants' states of residence are
substantially less than the State of Utah's requirements and is
also substantially less than the cost of registering with the
United States Coast Guard.
In 1994, the defendants were cited by an agent of the
State of Utah Department of Natural Resources, Division of Parks
and Recreation, for violating U.C.A. §73-18-7(1) which provides
that:
"(1)(a) Each motorboat . . . on the waters of
the state shall be registered, unless it is
exempt . . . .
(b) A person may not place or give permission
for the placement of a motorboat . . .
on
any waters of this state . . . unless the
motorboat . . . is registered in accordance
with this chapter or is exempt from
registration as provided for in Section
73-18-9.
(c) The division before issuing a
registration card and registration decals
shall require . . . a certificate from the
county assessor of the county in which the

PICKETT\PLEADING\Brief.UCA

-8-

motorboat . . . has situs for taxation
containing one of the following statements:
(i) the property tax on the motorboat . . .
for the current year has been paid . . . .
(6) The non-resident owner of any motorboat .
. . already covered by a valid number . . .
shall be exempt from registration . . .
unless he is operating in excess of the
reciprocity period provided for in Subsection
73-18-9(1) ."
Utah law at U.C.A. §73-18-9(1) (1994) provided that a
non-resident owner with a valid out-of-state registration would
not be required to register in this state if he had not been
within the state in excess of 14 days for the calendar year.
In May, 1994, defendant Sterkel received a letter
from a Division Ranger addressed to Lake Powell boat owners, that
warned him that Coast Guard documentation was not adequate to
comply with State boat registration laws.

(R. 6).

The moorage slips, boat storage, and other services for
maintaining the defendants' boats and all boats secured within
the GCNRA are managed by a concessioner of NPS.
The trial court held that although federal registration
of boating activity within the GCNRA is "extensive, even
pervasive" (R. 166), there has been no identification of "any
conflict between federal laws and regulations and the state laws
in question."

Further, the trial court concluded that the

property taxes that must be paid by the defendants to register
their boats for use on Lake Powell are dedicated "to support the
general function of government, not the enforcement of particular
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laws" and that such tax requirements do not have to be in a
"direct quid pro quo relationship between revenues and
expenditures."
B.

(R. 167).

CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS HAVE PREEMPTED
THE STATE FROM REGULATING BOAT REGISTRATION WITHIN THE
GCNRA.
State laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the

laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution," are
preempted and invalid.
U.S. 597, 604 (1991).

Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
It is well established that Congress has

the power to preempt state law in a given area.

Pacific Gas &

Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
State law may be preempted by express congressional statement, by
federal occupation of the field, or by direct conflict with
federal law.

Integrity Management Int'l, Inc. v. Tombs & Sons,

Inc., 836 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1987); Patten v. Lederle Lab., 655
F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1987).

Such exercise is a matter of

intent of Congress, and the issue is resolved by an analysis of
that intent.

Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn. 375 U.S. 96, 103

(1963) .
The court must determine congressional intent based on
its analysis of the general purposes of the federal statute and
the relationship between those general purposes and the state
action at issue.
ways.

Such a purpose may be evidenced in several

The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to

make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the

PICKETT\PLEADING\Brief.UCA

-10-

State to supplement it.

Or the Act of Congress may touch a field

in which the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. [Or] the object
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.

Or the

state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective
of the federal statute.
U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331

When explicit preemptory language is

absent, Congress's intent to totally supplant state law, or
"preempt the field," may be implicit where a "scheme of federal
regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it,
"where an " [a]ct of Congress [touches] a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject," or where "the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may
reveal the same purpose" to preempt state authority.

Pacific Gas

& Electric Co., 461 U.S. 190 at 203-04.
Stated another way, any state law is potentially
subject to preemption by federal law under any of the following
three theories:

(1) state regulations in areas left unregulated

by Congress where the state regulation may nevertheless violate
the Commerce Clause.

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437

U.S. 617 (1978); (2) when Congress legislates within a legitimate
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sphere of authority, the Supremacy Clause empowers Congress
explicitly to preempt state regulation in that area.

(For

example, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 6929, explicitly preempts state waste handling laws
that are less stringent than the federal controls; and, (3) even
when Congress does not explicitly preempt all state regulation in
a given field, the federal statutory scheme may impliedly preempt
a particular state regulation.

Hines v. Davidowitzf 312 U.S. 52

(1941).
When Congress has expressed an extensive interest in an
activity that has interstate ramifications or where there is a
unique federal interest, it can be judicially found that federal
regulation in that circumstance may supersede state regulation.
This circumstance is most likely to exist when, among other
things, federal regulation can prevent burdens on interstate
commerce.

Gray, Regulation

and Federalism,

1 Yale J. Reg. 93,

96-110 (1983) .
1.

Preemption Has Occurred Through Express
Congressional Statement.
The Maritime Laws Revision Act of 1984, P.L.

98-89, as cofidied at 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301, et seq., and 46 U.S.C.
§§ 13101, et seq.. incorporates numerous federally mandated
safety requirements to be imposed by either federal or state
officials.

This act applies to all recreational vessels and

assorted equipment operating on waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. At 46 U.S.C. § 4306, Congress
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expressly barred states from enforcing their own recreational
vessel performance and safety standards.

The savings clause in

the act may not preserve a state law or regulation which
conflicts with the objectives of a federal law, even if it is
possible to comply with both.

Shields v. Outdoor Marine Corp.,

776 F. Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991) ; also see Mowery v. Mc- ^ary
Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio
1991).
46 U.S.C. §§ 13101, et seq.. covers many of the
same activities as the Utah Boating Act, such as reporting to an
advisory council, identification, safety responsibilities, safety
devices, and the like.

Regulations developed by the Secretary at

Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, in combination with the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq., provide
an adjudicatory process, and in addition the regulations cover
the same activities as the State's regulations concerning
waterway marking systems, zoning of waters, identification of
boats, safety devices, and the like.

Coast Guard regulations

deal with many of the same safety issues as the Department of the
Interior and the State.

See 33 C.F.R. Part 2, 33 C.F.R.

§ 3.55-10(b), 33 C.F.R. § 5.03 and 33 C.F.R. § 110.127a.
Department of the Interior defers to the Coast Guard'

The

authority

when their regulations conflict (36 C.F.R. § 3.1), but it is
apparent that the federal agencies intended to coordinate so as
to effectively cover water safety within the GCNRA.
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Congress gave the Coast Guard the exclusive
authority to establish safety regulations for pleasure boats and
explicitly provided that all State regulations not identical to
federal rules were invalid.

46 TJ.S.C. § 4306.

'Where the Coast

Guard declines to adopt regulations requiring a certain safety
device covering a certain instance the state cannot adopt its own
safety device.

Shields v. Outdoor Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp.

1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
Nothing in the Federal boat safety laws, the Coast
Guard laws and regulations or the laws administered by the
Secretary of the Interior confer jurisdiction upon the states to
regulate boating activities within the GCNRA.
Additionally, the 1944 Flood Control Act, 58 Stat.
887, read as a whole, envisioned a scheme of federal, not state,
regulation over federal projects involving interstate navigable
rivers where the federal projects were a part of a scheme for the
entire river.

See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South

Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 825 n.23 (8th Cir. 1983), cert,

denied,

464

U.S. 1042, 104 S. Ct. 707, 79 L.Ed.2d 171.

2•

The Trial Court Erred in Finding No Conflict
Between Federal and State Laws.
The trial court said that the defendants "have not

. . . identified any conflict between federal laws and
regulations and the state laws in question here."

That court

interpreted that to uphold the defendants' claim the court must
find "whether compliance with the questioned state law would
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prevent or impede compliance with federal laws or regulations."
The court found that the defendants' assertion that the
registration requirements of Utah law would discourage use of the
Utah portion of Lake Powell was "speculative, remote and
insubstantial."
At conflict in the instant case are the Division's
attempts to enforce the Utah Boating Act and the Secretary of the
Interior and the Secretary of Transportation enforcement of
regulations governing a broad panoply of activities within the
Recreation Area, including boating.

Specifically, both of the

federal agencies require the boat owner within the GCNRA to
display an identification number on the hull of each vessel,
36 C.F.R. § 3.1, before such boat may be operated within the
GCNRA.

This simple requirement directly conflicts with the

State's requirement that every such boat have both the
identification number either issued by the Coast Guard or by the
State, and a certificate from the county assessor that the owner
has paid the property tax on the boat.

The State's tax

requirement has nothing to do with boater safety or
identification for law enforcement purposes.

The tax requirement

adds burdens to the use of the federal facility.

This burden has

not been specifically authorized by Congress.
The impact upon the boat owner to obtain the
county assessor's approval is significant.

Although the minimum

tax on a $500 boat is only $8.50, as a practical matter the
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values of the boats at Lake Powell are far greater and thus the
tax is proportionately greater.

The amount of the tax is based

on the "percent good" factor against the original cost new or the
F.O.B. or P.O.E. price from the ABOS Marine Blue Book.
33E.17.

R884 24P

It would be fair to conclude that the tax would amount

to hundreds of dollars, and in many instances, thousands of
dollars each year.

This cost to operate a boat at Lake Powell is

substantially more than in the surrounding states of Nevada,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution invalidates all state laws that conflict or
interfere with acts of Congress and mandates that federal
statutes and federal regulations take precedence over state laws.
Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 107 S. Ct. 334 (1986);
Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Martinez, 772 F. Supp. 1263
(S.D. Fla. 1991).

States may not circumscribe or impair

federally protected rights.

Mun. Utilities Bd. of Albertville v.

Alabama Power Co., 34 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
Even where the preemptive intent by Congress is
not inferential, "state law is nullified to the extent that it
actually 'conflicts' with federal law."

Hillsborough County v.

Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 471 U.S. 707
(1985).

The United States Supreme Court has described two

situations where the conflict rule may come into play.

In

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 464 U.S. 238
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(1984), and in Pacific Gas £ Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983), the

-urt

noted that a conflict could occur where concurrent complin „e
with both the federal and state or local regulation of a matter
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Federal regulations can preempt state laws as
effectively as federal statutes.

Hillsborough, supra.

Where

conflicts arise between federal regulations and state and local
regulations regarding public lands, the latter are preempted.
City and County of Denver by and Through Bd. of Water Comm'rs v.
Bergland, 517 F. Supp. 155, Judgment
part,

aff'd

in part,

rev'd

in

695 F.2d 465, 19 ERC 1443 (10th Cir. Colo., Dec. 09, 1982).
"It is settled that when Congress acts upon the

subject all state laws covering the same field are necessarily
superseded by reason of the supremacy of the national authority."
New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield. 244 U.S. 147, 148 (1917).
Where the states and Congress have concurrent power, "that of the
State [was] superseded when the power of Congress [over
interstate commerce was] exercised."

Southern Railway v. Reid.

222 U.S. 424, 436 (1912).
C.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OCCUPIES THE FIELD OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE WITHIN THE GCNRA.
Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent

to supersede state law altogether may be found from a scheme of
federal regulation from which it may be implied that such
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regulation is sufficiently comprehensive or pervasive to make it
appear that Congress "left no room" for supplementation by state
or local laws.

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy

Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
203-204 (1983).

"It must follow in consequence of the action of

Congress . . . that the power of the State over the subject
matter ceased to exist from the moment that Congress exerted its
paramount and all-embracing authority over the subject.

We say

this because the elementary and long settled doctrine is that
there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce and
that the regulations of Congress on that subject are supreme."
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers
Elevator Co.. 226 U.S. 426, 435 (1913).

Preemption may be

implicit if a scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it," if "the Act of Congress . . . touch[es]
a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject," or if the goals "sought to be
obtained" and the "obligations imposed" reveal a purpose to
preclude state authority.

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331

U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Lab. , Inc.. 105 S. Ct. 2371, 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
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23 8 (1984) . Preemption may also be found where state legislation
would impede purposes and objectives of Congress.

R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, N.C.. 107 S. Ct. 499 (1986).

A

Corps of Engineers dam and reservoir that is part of a system of
dams and reservoirs within a multi-state area precluded a state's
fish and game department froir enforcing its own laws within the
lands taken for dam and reservoir purposes.

Lower Brule Sioux

Tribe v. State of South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 826 (8th Cir.
1983), cert,

denied,

464 U.S. 1042, 104 S. Ct. 707, 79 L.Ed.2d

171; Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of South Dakota v. United States,
712 F.2d 349, 354 (8th Cir. 1983).

In these cases, the court

examined the Missouri River as an interrelated unitary system of
dams and reservoirs, much like the Colorado River insofar as the
federal projects acted together to provide flood control,
irrigation and power development.

The court was convinced by the

need of the Secretary of the Army to have total control of the
taken area so that the purposes of the taking could be
accomplished without interference from the state and the local
Indian tribe.

Such is the teaching that is applicable to the

instant case.
Similarly, in State of South Dakota v. Bourland, 113
S. Ct. 2309 (1993), the state challenged the authority of an
Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing on public lands
taken by the Corps of Engineers for dam and reservoir purposes.
The court construed the 1944 Flood Control Act as authorizing
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public recreational facilities on the lands taken for a Corps of
Engineers reservoir located on the Missouri River.
§ 460d.

16 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court construed the Flood Control Act as

affirmatively allowing the public to hunt and fish on such lands,
subject to federal regulation.

The Bourland court concluded that

when Congress broadly opens such land to the public, the effect
of the transfer is the destruction of pre-existing regulatory
control.

The court did not address whether South Dakota had

concurrent regulatory control over hunting and fishing in the
taken area.

Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2318, note 12.

Whether activities within a navigable stream are
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction requires an evaluation
of the nature of the matter to determine whether the federal
interest is exclusive of the state. Navigable waters of the
United States are deemed as "public property of the nation, and
subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress."

Wyandotte

Transp. Co. v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 379, 389 U.S. 191, 201
(1967).

The federal government is thus charged with insuring

that navigable waterways and other routes of commerce remain free
of obstruction.

Implicit with this federal power is the power to

prevent all obstructions, whether the obstruction is a physical
one or one imposed by unauthorized jurisdictional intrusions by
state agencies.
The Colorado River has received extensive federal
legislative and executive branch attention to further national
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objectives that are traditionally outside of the state
experience, i.e. electrical power development, irrigation, flood
control, navigation, water storage, international treaty
performance, recreation and other purposes intended for the
national interest.

The principal beneficiaries were uniquely

federal.
In Bilderback v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 903 (D.
Or. 1982), the national forest land was determined to not be
governed by the state's livestock open range law due to the
pervasive and detailed federal law governing grazing in the
national forests.

In this instance the federal law had not

required the fencing of livestock within the national forest,
whereas state law would have required the owner of the livestock
to be responsible for fencing in his livestock.

The trial court

concluded that the federal government's pervasive grazing laws
preempted the state's open range law.
The Secretary has promulgated extensive regulations at
chapter I, Part 3 of Title 3 6 of the Code of Federal Regulations
within which the Secretary extends pervasive controls over the
above activities occurring within the national parks in general
and the GCNRA in specific.

These controls include, preservation

of natural, cultural and archeological resources, providing
wildlife protection, fishing, law enforcement, camping,
picnicking, fire control, sanitation, animal control, airports,
motor vehicles, regulating boating, smoking, trespassing,
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alcoholic beverages, gambling, soliciting, use of explosives,
special events, meetings and gatherings, swimming, traffic
control, signage, drinking water, public accommodations, visitor
information, roads, commercial and private operations, labor
standards, minerals management, cemeteries, grazing, commercial
fishing, contracts and permits, inspections, safety regulations,
historic preservation, and the like.

Further, the Secretary

collects fees from users to pay for the services that the
Department and the NPS render to the public.
To facilitate the providing of recreational services
provided by the NPS and its concessioner to the Area, the GCNRA
has entered into various cooperative agreements with other
federal and Indian tribal agencies, including the BLM, the Navajo
Nation, the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"), U.S. Geological Survey
("USGS"), Canyonlands National Park, the Coast Guard, with the
States of Utah and Arizona, with the City of Page, Arizona, with
the counties of Garfield, Kane, and Wayne in Utah, and Coconino
County in Arizona, with a private emergency medical services
provider, with two universities, and with Bullfrog Resort and
Marina, Inc.
The agreements between NPS and the state and local
agencies pertain to a broad range of activities pertaining to
wildlife, boating safety administration, the use of radio
frequencies, investigative roles of NPS commissioned officers in
relation to state and local agencies, deputization of park
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rangers by Garfield County sheriff, investigative roles of NPS
commissioned officers in relation to Kane and Coconino counties'
sheriffs' offices, use of Coconino County's sheriff's office
radio frequency, use of Arizona lake improvement funds for
construction of Wahweap visitor use facilities, deputization of
Arizona public safety personnel as National Park Service Special
Police Officers, programmatic agreement regarding the
preservation of historic places and objects, and use of Arizona
telecommunications site. A listing of some of the agreements
among the GCNRA and the various federal agencies, Indian tribes,
states, local governments, and private entities are found at
90-96 of the record.
Although the education of students in grades K-12 is
normally the function of the state, even the new K-12 school at
Bullfrog within the GCNRA will be funded through the construction
set-aside program of the National Park Service and the buildings
will be the property of the NPS.

The NPS has signed a Memorandum

of Understanding with the Kane County School District whereby the
District has agreed to operate the school programs, pay for all
utilities, and all maintenance costs of the school.

The school

primarily will service children living in the Halls Crossing and
Bullfrog areas.

Faculty will be housed at the school site.

Other memoranda of understandings exist between the NPS
and the Division of Wildlife Resources, including an April 27,
1993 agreement under which the GCNRA provides to the stace three
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boat slips at Wahweap and one slip at Bullfrog, the use of
various support facilities and to maintain the access to the
State's Stateline facility.

A June 10, 1993 agreement with the

Division requires both parties to not take any action affecting
wildlife without consultation with the other, and acting with
respect to wildlife in accordance with NPS standards.
The NPS also has an agreement with the Utah Highway
Patrol ("UHP11) dated May 19, 1993 which grants UHP access to
radio communications frequencies under certain conditions,
although net control is maintained by the NPS.
The NPS's agreement with the Utah Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Energy, provides that the NPS will install
various electrical paraphernalia to monitor electrical demands
and other functions wherein the information will be shared with
the State.

The State will use federal funds and other state

controlled funds.
There simply is no room for independent state action
within the GCNRA.

Any state action must depend upon cooperative

independent agreements with the Department of the Interior and
Transportation agencies.
D.

NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE ADVANCED BY EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL
REGULATION IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE.
The choice of whether state or federal law ought to

apply in a given instance depends on three factors:

"whether

there is need for a nationally uniform body of law to apply in
situations capable to this, whether application of state law
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would frustrate federal policy or functions, and the impact a
federal rule might have on existing relationships under state
law."
(1979).

United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28
The need for uniformity should be assessed in terms of

Congress' intent at the time of the passage of the act.

Leo

Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 681-82 & n. 18 (1979).
Congress and the Supreme Court have been consistent
since the early part of the twentieth century in treating the
entire length of the River as an integrated interstate unit
intended to serve the multi-purpose water and recreation needs of
a large region of the Nation and to meet the Nation's
international obligations.

Lake Powell is the heart for

accomplishing these national objectives.

It would be

inconsistent with the purposes of Congress if each of the seven
states affected by the Colorado River had the authority to impose
its own unique requirements upon river recreationists that
created disparity in access to the river's benefits.
State law is impliedly preempted when, even though it
does not conflict with a federal statute, it would unduly
frustrate the purposes of that statute to permit concurrent state
regulation.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Perez v.

Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
the GCNRA and Lake r.
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these federal facilities, compel the need for uniform national
regulations.
Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 18, to authorize actions, which in themselves, are not
within Congress' express Article I powers, but serve to
effectuate other policies within the express powers.

"Let the

end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end . . . are constitutional."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).

In an

interstate context the courts have found it reasonable to require
uniformity in regulations in order to achieve uniformity and
equality in services for the intended users of the interstate
facility.

"It seems to us that the congressional purpose can be

achieved only if a uniform federal law governs as to the
standards of service which the carrier must provide and as to the
extent of liability for failure to comply with such standards."
Cooperative Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 867 F.Supp. 1511,
1517, citing Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
The interstate character of Lake Powell, the national
and international importance of the river and its water projects,
and the extensive, even pervasive, federal regulatory presence,
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compel that there be uniformity and equality in regulating access
and use of these federal waters.
E.

THE STATE'S BOAT REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT THAT PROPERTY
TAX BE PAID BEFORE BOAT OWNER MAY USE THE WATERS OF
LAKE POWELL VIOLATES THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE.
In the case at hand, non-resident defendants who desire

to use the federally provided boat facilities for more than 14
days each year at federally developed, operated and maintained
Lake Powell provided by the federal government do not use the
waters within the State outside of the GCNRA in that period.
Nonetheless, each is compelled by the State to pay the
substantial property tax on his/her boat or face the penalties of
the Utah Boating Act, including non-use of the Lake and having
the boat seized and sold.

The State requires this

notwithstanding that it provides only nominal services to the
defendants.
The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which
exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission;
but does not extend to those means which are employed by Congress
to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the
people of the United States.

Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee,

117 U.S. 151-155 (1886) . The states have no power, by taxation
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general
government.

Van Brocklin at 156.
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State tax does not violate

dormant commerce clause when tax is applied to activity with
substantial nexus with taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to services provided by the state.

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n

v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995); Insinger Mach.
Co. v. Philadelphia Tax Review Bd,, 645 A.2d 365, cert,

denied,

657 A.2d 494 (1994) .
The United States may perform its functions without
conforming to the police regulations of a state. Arizona v.
California, 283 U.S. 423, 451 (1931).

Congress must consent

expressly and affirmatively to state or local actions that
"impose substantial burdens" on interstate or foreign commerce.
South Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91-2
(1984).

The Commerce Clause even without implementing

legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the
States.

Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).

For state

to impose tax on activity consistent with commerce clause and due
process clause, there must be connection to activity itself,
rather than connection only to actors state seeks to tax. Allied
Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. Of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992).
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.
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362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).

If a legitimate local purpose is

found, then the question becomes one of degree.

And the extent

of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well ^'th a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) . Even if a
local activity is appropriate to be regulated in the interest of
safety, health and well-being of the community, a regulation that
impedes interstate or foreign commerce may be found

in violation

if reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to
conserve legitimate local interests, are available.

Dean Milk

Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
Under the Utah Property Tax Act, § 59-2-301, tassessor assesses all boats located within the county.
Administrative Code at R884 24P 33.

mty

UU.

The assessor assesses and

collects the personal property tax on boats based on the "percent
good" factor against the original cost new or the F.O.B. or
P.O.E. price from the ABOS Marine Blue Book.

Boats have a

minimum value of $500 and a minimum tax of $8.50.

R884 24P 33.

Registration of that personal property may not be completed
unless the uniform fee has been paid, even if the taxpayer is
appealing the uniform fee valuation.

If the ov

of the

personal property registered in Utah is domiciled outside of
Utah, the taxable situs of the property is presumed to be the
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county in which the uniform fee was paid, unless an assessor's
affidavit establishes otherwise.

Id.

All revenue collected by the county under the local
levy in excess of its approved budget for assessment, collection,
and distribution of property taxes and related appraisal programs
is "transmitted to the state treasure" and is redistributed to
counties having tax collection budget shortfalls "in accordance
with the certified [tax collection] budgets."

U.C.A.

§ 17-19-15(6) (1994).
Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah Constitution provides
that "[a]11 tangible property in the state, not exempt under the
laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to
be ascertained as provided by law."
All corporation or persons in this State, or doing
business herein, are subject to taxation for State, County,
School, Municipal or other purposes, on the real and personal
property owned or used by them within the Territorial limits of
the authority levying the tax.

Article XIII, § 10.

Boats as ". . . watercraft . . . not otherwise exempt
under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution,
may be exempted from taxation as property by the Legislature. . .
that is required by law to be registered with the state before it
is used on a public highway, on a public waterway, on public
land, or in the air."
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Every tax has the effect of a judgment against the
person, and every lien created by the tax laws has the force and
effect of an execution duly levied against all personal property
of the delinquent.

The judgment is not satisfied nor the lien

removed until the taxes are paid or the property sold for the
payment of the judgment or lien.

U.C.A. § 59-2-1301.

The county

has the right to sell the property to satisfy its tax lien.
U.C.A. § 59-2-1303.

See also Fisher v. Wright, 123 P.2d 703

(Utah 1942) .
1.

The Substantially Greater Burden Imposed By
Utah's Boat Registration Requirements As
Compared To Surrounding States' Burdens
Impermissibly Interferes With Interstate
Commerce.
Surrounding states have much less onerous boat

registration laws.

Nevada requires the boat owner to pay a

minimum fee of $15, plus a certain fee for the length of the boat
ranging in cost from $10 for less than 13 feet to $75 for 31 feet
or more.

N.R.S. § 488.075.

The owner is exempted from obtaining

such a permit if he/she already is covered by a number issued to
it by operative federal law or a federally approved numbering
system of another state for 90 days.

N.R.S. § 488.085.

If a

federal agency of the United States has in force a system of
identification numbering system for motorboats, the state's plan
must conform with the federal plan.

N.R.S. § 488.105.

The State of Colorado requires the payment of a
nominal fee and recognizes that vessels numbered in accordance
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with applicable federal law or in accordance with a federally
approved numbering system of another state will be recognized up
to 60 days.

C.R.S. § 33-13-103.
Likewise, the State of New Mexico requires the

payment of a nominal fee and recognizes that vessels numbered in
accordance with applicable federal law require that the state
agency conform to the federal system.
66-12-5.1.

N.M.S. §§ 66-12-5 and

The State of Arizona requires residents to pay a

registration fee of four dollars, plus a tax of $.45 per foot of
the boat and non-residents to pay ten dollars and a tax of one
dollar and forty-five cents per foot. A.R.S. §§ 5-321A.1 and
A.2.

The registration requirements of these states stand in

stark contrast to the Utah Boating Act.
In Bibb v. Navaio Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520
(1959), an Illinois law required trucks to have contour mud
flaps.

The Court found that the Illinois law hopelessly

conflicted with an Arkansas law that required straight mud flaps.
Because it was physically impossible for an interstate truck to
comply with the mud flaps of both states, the Court concluded
that the idiosyncratic and empirically unsupported Illinois law
could not stand.

The Court will overturn a state law burdening

interstate commerce when it finds an actual, present conflict
between that law and the law of another state that affects the
same instrumentalities of commerce.
Cement Co.. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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Also see Huron Portland

The boater registration requirements of Utah are
at such variance with the laws of the surrounding states,
especially Ar zona which shares the same interstate Lake Powell,
that Utah's registration law must be found to impermissibly
burdens interstate commerce when Utah's law is applied on Lake
Powell or within the GCNRA.
2.

The Utah Boat Registration Requirement to Pay
Property Tax Is Clearly Excessive In Relation
To Local Benefits.
"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to

effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.

Pike, 397 U.S. 137 at

142.
The state is free to pursue its own fiscal
policies, . . . if by the practical operation of a tax the state
exerts its power in relation to opportunities which it has given,
to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has
conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) .
Also, each state may tax all property, real or
personal, within its borders, belonging to persons or
corporations, although employed in interstate commerce, providing
the rights and powers of a national government are not interfered
with.

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U.S. 14 (1896).
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archeological and historical preservation, grazing, protection of
Indian religious values, protection of Indian monuments, fish,
wildlife, and rare plants protection, protection of certain
species, protection of wilderness, protection of water quality,
protection or mitigation of wetlands, land conservation,
floodplain management, and other purposes.
The states have no power to retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the general government.
U.S. 151 (1886).

Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117

Thus, when Congress authorized federal agencies

to withdraw existing public lands from the public domain for dam,
reservoir, and recreation purposes, to acquire non-federal lands
within the Area for those purposes and then later authorized the
acquisition of more lands for recreation related purposes, and
yet again authorized the exchange of state lands for federal
lands outside the Area, it made its intent clear.

Congress

intended that the United States control all of the lands and
waters within the vicinity of the dam, reservoir (Lake Powell),
and the lands surrounding it so that the federal agencies
responsible for those federal projects on such lands could
execute their responsibilities without interference by the state.
Further, it is evident that Congress intended that the user
public would be likewise free from interference from the State.
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As a resul
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and the regulations ;.omulyated pursuant to those acts, the State
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privileges w:" r.. r.
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*

jice U pon th~ defendants the requirements

lax A^t as a c... - I mil I i 111, i i nj Lite federal
,e GCNRA.
/ 01 August, 1996.

Dennis Iekes
of PARRY MURRAY & WARD
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this
day of August, 1996, I served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF by
hand delivering the same to the following:
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Original

Christine F. Soltis, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Copy

Norman K. Johnson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

Copy

A copy of the same was delivered by United States Postal Service,
first class mail prepaid, to:
Craig C. Halls, Esq.
San Juan County Attorney
297 South Main Street
Post Office Box 850
Monticello, UTU 84535
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COUR.
§ar ''p*-County
FILED FEB - I

1996

CUtHivur ?hfc COURT

sy

"T^FT^fv"

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

CONRAD STERKEL, MEL G. CAHO,
WILLIAM A. PICKETT, ALAN L.
HERMAN,
Defendant.

Case No. 9417-156, 9417172, 9417-197, and 9417-200

Defendants in these cases have moved to dismiss the charges
filed against them for failing to register their boats.
demonstrated,

and

the

state

concedes, that

the

Each has

boats

were

maintained and operated within the confines of the Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area (lfGCNRA,f) .
The court has reviewed all of the memoranda filed by counsel.
After

initially

requesting

oral

argument,

counsel

for

the

defendants notified the court on January 29, 1996, that oral
argument was waived.
Defendants maintain that the land within GCNRA is exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the United States and that the laws of
the State of Utah are without any force there. Alternatively, if
there is some state jurisdiction within GCNRA it cannot extend to
requiring defendants to register and pay taxes on their boats
located there.

Defendants have failed to persuade the court that Congress
intended to divest the State of Utah generally of its power to
enforce state laws within GCNRA.

They have not identified any

express legislative language effecting a divestit re.

Absent any

express statement, the court has no need to determine if Congress
has

the

power

to

divest

Utah

of

jurisdiction.

Utah

has

jurisdiction to enforce its laws except as preempted by Congress
exercising its powers under the Property Clause.
The state concedes that, even though federal jurisdiction over
GCNRA is not exclusive, Congress has the power under the Property
Clause to preempt state laws that interfere with federal regulation
of federal property.

The state also concedes that such preemption

need not be explicit,
evident.

if interference with federal goals is

Since defendants nave not

identified

any explicit:

congressional preemption of the state's boating registration laws,
their

preemption
Defendants

claim

have

must

rest

demonstrated

on

that

actual
federal

interference.
regulation

boating activity within GCNRA is extensive, even pervasive.

of

They

have not, however, identified any conflict between federal laws and
regulations and the state laws in question here. The question, as
this

court

questioned

understands

it,

whether

compliance

with

the

state law would prevent or impede compliance with

federal laws or regulations.
such

is

interference.

registration —

They

Defendants have not identified any
suggest

that

and related taxation —

enforcement

of

the

requirements of Utah law

may discourage them from leaving their boats at GCNRA, discourage
2

il I
looring.
insubstantial.

firui^

or encourage some owners t o change the place

Those

effects

are

J vw«11

sp< i • u 1 JI J vr f

.111" I

T h e court declines to rest a finding of preemption

considering

the

significant t h e absence

preemption

claim,

of any federal

I In.

i.'i. nil

participation

I n ill

jn these

ist Guard

nre

.:i 11r s regi ^ 11 d! 1111

apparently n o t concerned that enforcement

laws would impair their effective regulation of boating activity

Finally, the court addresses the related
argument of defendant?

*•- ^ related to

Commerce

clause

preemption claim,.

is separate ana uase i
limits

las

Defendants claim that the i«u»

-,iicn.

ne? ,»^^

K

order In register their boats are not fairly r e n t e d :

.

ervices

provided with.
Defendants m i s t a k e t h e purpose of property t a x e s
taxes

collected t o support t h e general function of government,

not t h e enforcement c\
obligation
enfnrrempr

partic ulai laws

'i'i i, .i.iic

i HI I I

i

provide general government s e r v i c e s , such as Jctw
,

n o t required

if 'ir i s e r v i c e s , and education,
demonstrate a ilirec I. yi . J yi_j

between revenues and expenditures.
tii"'TPf i

Property

I "! i I as w e l l .

in i in in GCNRA.

n

is

j u u i t~ • 1 > i I • ..i«, I. .,)

T h e Commerce Clause cl aim m u s t

Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. The parties are
directed to appear before the court on February 29, 1996, at 9:30
a.m. to set their trial dates and address any additional pre-trial
issues.

DATED the

M.

of January, 1996.

Distfrzct Court Judge

'A^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I mailed a copy of the RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, postage
prepaid, this ffi day of < W I H
1996, to the following:
Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
P.O. Box 850
Monticello, UT 84535

Mr. R. Dennis I ekes
Attorney for Defendants
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Deputy Court Clerk

4

f
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SEVENThUlSlHiGl CUUR I'
San Juan County

The Honorable Judge Andeison
Seventh District Court
I . 0 . Box 6>-

PILED

1i
P-ai

AUG 2 S 133*
CLERK OF THE COURT
Deputy
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l e t t e r _. Leing w: . : ' c * i nc^i n \ n r, t i\\\ ! sark
citation
H O . B 8 9 2 0 0 7 ( A t t a c h m e n t A .:.,•;!. ! p r e s e n t e d
Tla in your
o f f i c e y e s t e r d a y , A u g u s t 1 8 , 1 9 9 4 at 1 1 : 1 5 A . M . At t h a t tim«1
- 1 -- nosted the $ 7 4 . 0 0 bail a l o n r uiin a p i e . o

'NILS

M n c e my h o m e in C o l o r a d o is 3 2 5 m i l e s Irom
tjif
c o u r t w a s in s e s s i o n at the t i m e , I l a s u g g e s t e d tha
letter when I got h o m e .
IF it p l e a s e s i U ~ r ..,,. _
. , c a s e , as f r, \ • * s ;

tri ' s

1.)

I pui ( hased a II nil" lite Yatlil Home boat in May of /, :and it has been stored in a covered slip at Hall's
Crossing Marina since that time. This boat has aJwav
carried a Colorado registration and, until May of 1 9c* *- ,
I had never received notification of any kind from tInState of Utah or the National Park Service that
iu -t
was improperly registered.

2.)

My iinpression has a 1 ways been that, since Lake Powe 11
is in a National. Park: and since it lies in more than
one State, the National Park Service must have official
jurisdiction on boating as they do on the operation
the the marinas and other thi rigs. - I believe this is i ;•-<
reason a high percentage of the boats on this lake hbeen registered in Arizona and Colorado ever since
have been there.

3.)

i renewed inj t •
Attachment B ) .

;istration

on J a n . 2 0 , 19 9 4

4 . ) In May ol *
- f ;'i\:-5
f-ttci
,
'tat v of
t
U t a h d a t e d May _ , lww< , .\ t * -. hment ]) and m a i l e d on
May 9, 1 9 9 4 ( A t t a c h m e n t D ) . P l e a s e n o t e that thi<= lo
r
was w r i t t e n after the 1 9 9 3 C o l o r a d o registration
e x p i r a t i o n d a t e of D e c . 3 1 , 1 9 9 3 as well as the Utah
registration
e x p i r a t i o n d a t e of A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 9 4 , 1 ,:u
not t h i n k it w a s p r o p e r for the S t a t e of Utah to d e c l a r e
in t h e i r very first, n o t i f i c a t i o n t h at ' v o u j ^ he :. s s •; e d
a c i t a t i o n for t h i s v i o l a t i o n "'effective i m m e d i a t e l y "
11 see in s a 1 in o s t i in p - - ' -•' M e to m e to h a v e a 4 5 1 boat
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removed from this lake and to find an alternate location
for storage on a moment's notice. Therefore, I feel the
State of Utah is not acting in a fair and proper manner.
5.)

Since I live over 400 miles from Hall ! s Crossing and
for various other reasons, I made my first trip to the
lake on August 12, 1994. I did not take my boat out of
the slip as I wanted to first talk to some other boat
owners to determine what was going on. On August 14, 1994,
I was on my boat which had still not been taken out of
the slip when I was approached by four officers of Utah
State Parks. They informed me that my boat was improperly
registered.
When I tola them my story basically as
stated above and that I had not received their letter
until May of 1994, one of the officers told me that I was
wrong and that the letter was issued in February. Since
I did not have a copy of the letter (Attachment C) with
me, I had no proof. Even though I had never taken the
boat from its slip in 1994 and was not operating the vessc
then, the officer issued me the citation (Attachment A ) .

6.) I have been boating and fishing on Lake Powell since 1978
and have never even received a warning or any other
citation for any violation during those 16 years.
Your Honor, based on the above facts, I beg the court to find the
following:
THAT I should be permitted to operate my boat with my own
State's registration in a National Park as long as I
obey all rules and regulations of that National Park.
THAT the citation was issued even though I have every
intention of obeying the law and was not operating
my boat in willful disregard of the law and therefore
the citation should be dismissed.
THAT my boat not be impounded before your ruling and not
before I have reasonable time for compliance, if *ny,
as set by the court.
Thank you. If this letter is not sufficient for the court, I will
testify under oath at the time and date specified by you.
Yours tr

Conrad
cc:

Sterkel

Mr. Dave Harris
Utah Parks & Rec
Page, AZ

Ranger-in-Charge
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LOCATED AT .

rb

7^'/7'$r >'oo/:r
• ,w

PHONL
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Not less than five (5) or more than fourteen
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\

.SUSPENDED .

PLEA/FINDING
Guilty
No Contest
Not Guilty
Forfeited Bail
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I Vehicle Year I Vehicle Make
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D
D
a
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I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT
ACCORDING TO U W ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE
ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT/TO WHICH THE?DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR
IS THE PROPERjCOURT
PROPER .COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION ft/ 7 19

U Maximum
< O M P I AINANT

Signature of Judge or Clerk Required

DLD
USE

DEFENDANT COPY

Da,e Sem to DLD

Docket No

RIGHT INDEX
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COLORADO BUAT REGISTRATION

57

EXPIRES ON 12/31/94.

REGISTRATION NUMBER

CL81718P
("CONRAD
STERKEL
1381 SHEEPHORN RD
BOND
CO 80423

~\

J

L

MAKE

DATE O F BIRTH

1UNIPLITE

11/16/37

MODEL

HIN/VIN NUMBER

UNF039Z1M84I

rACHT HOME
PROP

IB

LENGTH

45

HULL

USE

F

P

TYPE

ur

OWN^fSIGNATURE

FUEL

G

YEAR

CCCMSP

1984

DATE PAID

*T

®
Michael 0. Leavitt
Governor
Ted Stewart
Executive Director
Courtland Nelson
Division Director

State of Utah

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
DIVISION OF PARKS AND RECREATION

A

TTTH H^vf£**T"

Southwest Region
POBox 1079
Cedar City, Utah 84721 -1079

601-586-4497
801-586-2789 (Fax)

Dear Lake Powell Boat Owner,
During a s m vey ol the slips and mooring buoys at Bullfrog and
Halls Crossing, .i I'ussel registered to yoi i "was found to be in one
of these areas,
The purpose of this letter is to advise/warn you tuai - . ^r vessel
is in violation of Utah's boat registration law.
Effective
immediately, operators of your vessel will be issued a cj tation
foi "operating an improperly registered vessel",
Utah1's boat registration law i equires that any boat in Utah for
more than 14 calendar days must be registered in Utah.
If your
vessel is Documented through the USCG, it is still required to be
registered in Utah.
Documentation does not exempt the vessel
from registration,
",_r exempts the vessel f-rr '"state
numbering system.
Please
County
County
proper

take this warning seriously and contact either the Kane
Boat Registration Office (Bullfrog Boats), or the San Juan
Boat Registration Office (Halls Crossing Boats), for the
forms.

If you have any questions concerning this information, please
contact me at the address/phone number below.
you nave already registered you vessel i.
please disregard this letter.
, - U,

A
Dave Harris
Lake Powell, Ranger-In-Charge
Utah Parks and Recreation
PO Box 2586
Page, AZ 86040
602/645-2344

through April

'7Tnkovhw&*,r~ ^

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
DIVISION OF PARKS AND RECREATION
Southwest Region
PO Box 1079
Cedar City. Utah 84721-1079
an equal opportunity employer

CONRAD STERKEL
1 3 8 1 SHEEPHORN RD
BOND CO 8 0 4 2 3
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San Juan County Attorney

State of Utah

CRAIG C HALLS
P.O. Box 850
Honticello. Utah 84535
801-587-2128 or 2129

August 22, 1994

PO fWt- Cr^J ZxqO. &**,

US'
Mr. William A. Pickett
P.O. Box 1889
Overton, NV 89040
Dear Mr. Pickett:
Attached please find a citation for Improper Registration of
your Boat which is located at Halls Crossing, Utah.
Section 73-18-7(1) requires that all boats located in Utah
waters over 14 days must be registered.
The fine for this citation is $74.00 and you must register
and pay the taxes on this boat within 20 days from this date or
your boat is subject to be seized and held until properly
registered.
Please
send the fine of $74.00 and proof of current
registation to the Clerk of the Court at P.O. Box 68, Monticello,
Ut. 84535, within 20 days of this date or a formal information
and a warrant for the seizure of the boat will be issued after that
date.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Sincerely,

Craig (g/. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
C:

Clerk of the Court

^ 4 -

SEVEN] H DISTRICT COL
San Juan County

Deput

DEFENDANT IS HEREBY GIVEN
NOTICE TO APPEAR IN THE

yTA||

DfV|S|0N QF pARK§ & RECR£ATio

}

UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR

CITATION NO.

(First)

(Last)

COURT OF

©

CASE NO.

ftCKMtr

B8897681
(Middle)

U//M#rr\

LOCATED AT

Social Security Number

nn*rt*<xil» o+ m a r

Eyes

Driver License No.
Picture ID

PHONE

D Yes

KfNo

TPP

\^\y6miMffw^mm?H/

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING:
MUST APPEAR IN
Not less than five (5) or more than fourteen
(1(1) days after issuance of this citation.
XJRT TIME

ff^>

nAY

imAVbfieA. M6i5rKi4T/Q'Q /e-y(0

23

Date

Was MM wit
ff-li

Military Time

..32 \jToo

Interstate
D Yes D No

Traf.

.SUSPENDED .

WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT, I PROMISE TO
TO APPEAR
APPEAR AS
/ DIRECTED HEREIN

IAU

.SUSPENDED .

SIGNATURE

SEVERITY
Minimum

D Intermediate
Maximum

Direction

N S E W

Speeding

FINE

•

z

N

/fl~F

DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE

•

Y
Misd.
at.

Code #

UT I CO I CY I

FOR COURT USE ONLY

PLEA/FINDING
• Guilty
• No Contest
D Not Guilty
• Forfeited Bail

Accident

I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE
ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW.
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAFmE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR
IS THE PROPER COUflT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-1J

no

OFFICER
COMPLAINANT

. ID # _

Signature of Judge or Clerk Required

DLD
USE

MISD. CIT.-BCI
TRAFFIC-COURT

Date Sent to DLD

RIGHT INDEX

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY GIVEN
*-—r"-TCOriCE TO APPEAR IN THE
COURT OF

UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR

Address

^

Place of

ff)*>\\ct\lp C¥ MS&
MUST APPEAR IN
Not less than five (5) or more than fourteen
(14) days after issuance of this citation.
COURT TIME

tl^

'
ftrth

Driver License No
Picture ID

PHONE

QTATION NO.

&

(Middle)

(City)
IDOB

"

^_J Z, P)

fStato)

-I Social Security Number
State

|Ht

ms\
wm*g/y\7>z.
/
Accident

U!p l't?'\1ffiV<MrriBtA"°~3i

Y

Code!

imMorft #£6it>r#Ar/QA)Wffi

21

•hriUSrt»v/yfr
#-H

jmiffi

Mile Post No

Mtsd
Qt

N

Traf

Z

WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT, I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN

JAIL

. SUSPENDED .

SIGNATURE

D Intermediate

N S E W

I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS QTATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE
ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAFTRE COURT TO WHICH THE DEF^DANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR
IS THE PROPER COgflf PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7 1}

D Maximum

. ID#
COMPLAINANT

Signature of Judge or Clerk Required

Direction
MPHOvef

. SUSPENDED .

SEVERITY
D Minimum

Interstate
D Yes G No

Speeding

FINE

DLD
USE

Eyes

| Hair

D Yes (SfNo
THE A&OVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING:
UT | CO | CY |

DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE

PLEA/FINDING
Guilty
No Contest
Not Guilty
Forfeited Bail

[~wl

lp

DAY fflrtL

FOR COURT USE ONLY

D
D
•
D

B889769

(LastL

puD?^

LOCATED AT

CASE NO

UTAH DIVISION OF PARKS & RECREATION

. ID#.

DATE_

DEFENDANT COPY

no

,19Date Sent to DLD

Docket No

RIGHT INDEX

$&2

,3*$&?L

oM'HKXOIX B

Appendix

COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN
RECREATION AREA AND OTHER AGENCIES
Between the Bureau of Land
National Recreation Area

GLEN

Management

CANYON
and

Glen

NATIONAL
Canyon

Memorandum of Understanding relating to grazing in Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area in the State of Arizona.
Memorandum of Understanding for coordination of wilderness
studies on adjacent Bureau of Land Management administered
lands.
Interagency Agreement for the
Escalante River Canyon Area.

administrative

use of the

Memorandum of Understanding to provide for the coordination,
at the field level, of management of National Park Service
areas and associated Bureau of Land Management public land
areas in Utah.
Memorandum of Understanding relating to grazing within Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area in the State of Utah,
Memorandum of Agreement for repeater sharing and operation
of two Bureau of Land Management resource radios in the
Paria Canyon and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area in
Arizona and Utah.
Cooperative Agreement for bighorn sheep transplant within
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area between the National
Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Utah
Division of Wildlife Resources.
Letter of Understanding for a cooperative plan for liquid
waste disposal from the Star Springs campgrounds to be
disposed of in the sewage disposal system at Bullfrog Basin.
Memorandum of Understanding pertaining to the use of the
Bureau of Land Management administrative site located at
Escalante, Utah.
Memorandum of Understanding for the administration of river
use on the San Juan River from Montezuma Creek, Utah, to
Clay Hills Crossing, Utah, located partly within Glen
Canyon.
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Between the Navajo Tribe and glen Canyon Nati^al^^crj?ation
Area
MeuioranduDi of Agreement relating to the use and development
of Glen Canyon National Recreation Area and adjacent tribal
lands.
Memorandum of Agreement related to repeater sharing with the
Navajo Mountain Ranger, Navajo Nation, Utah.
Between the U.S. Bureau
National Recreation Area

of

Reclamation

and

Glen

Canyon

Memorandum of Agreement for administration of recreation
facilities, lands, water, and reclamation works on land
withdrawn and acquired by the Bureau of Reclamation in the
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area.
Memorandum
from
Chief,
U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation,
pertaining to grounds maintenance at the Visitor Center.
Memorandum from Superintendent, Glen Canyon, to Regional
Director, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, relating to the
Dominguez-Escalante Trail Exhibit.
Memorandum of Agreement concerning the handling of accidents
at the visitor center and through the tour route.
Between the U.S. Geological Survey and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area
Memorandum of Agreement relating to the use and development
of certain lands within Glen Canyon at Lees Ferry.
Cooperative Agreement for stream-gauging operations to be
conducted in the Lees Ferry area, Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area.
Between the State
Recreation Area

of

Utah

and

Glen

Canyon

National

Cooperative Agreement between Utah Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, to reintroduce
desert bighorn sheep into Glen Canyon National Recreation
Area.
Memorandum of Agreement between Utah Division of Parks and
Recreation for boating law administration on the Utah
portion of Lake
Powell within Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area.
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Memorandum of Agreement between Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources for the use of radio frequencies on the Glen
Canyon radio system.
Memorandum of Agreement between Utah Division- of Park., and
Recreation for the use of radio frequencies on the Glen
Canyon radio system*
Cooperative communications agreement between Utah Department
of Transportation, Utah State Highway Patrol, for Gl^n
Canyon to utilize radio frequencies of the Utah St.
Highway Patrol.
Between the City of Page, Arizona, and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area
Memorandum of Understanding between Page Police Department
and Glen Canyon for radio dispatch assistance.
Letter from the Page Police Chief and Page Fire Chief
authorizing Glen Canyon to utilize two of the City of Page
radio frequencies.
Cooperative Agreement between the City of Page and Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area for construction of Wahweap
and Lees Ferry visitor-use facilities.
Between the United States
National Recreation Area

Coast

Guard

and

Glen

Canyon

Cooperative Boating Safety Agreement for a boating safety
program on all waters within the recreation area provided by
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, and the U.S. Coast
Guard will be responsible over matters which are within its
exclusive jurisdiction.
Cooperative
Navigational
Aids
Agreement
for
the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of a system of
navigational aids and regulatory markers conforming to
established standards.
Letter of concurrence for Glen Canyon National Recreation
Area to use Channel 22 to communicate with boaters on Lake
Powell.
Between Garfield
Recreation Area

County,

Utah,

and

Glen Canyon

National

Memorandum of Understanding between Garfield County, Ut
Sheriff's Office, and Glen Canyon National Recreation A: -v
detailing investigative roles of the National Park Service
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Commissioned Officers in relationship to the State and local
agencies.
Memorandum of Agreement for deputation of park rangers by
the Sheriff of Garfield County, Utah.
Between Kane County,
Recreation Area

Utah,

and

Glen

Canyon

National

Memorandum of Understanding between Kane County, Utah,
Sheriff's Office, and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area
detailing investigative roles of the National Park Service
Commissioned Officers in relationship to State and local
agencies.
Between Coconino County, Arizona, and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area
Letter of Authorization for the use of Coconino County
Sherifffs
Office
radio
frequency
for
emergency
law
enforcement activities by Glen Canyon National Recreation
Area.
Cooperative Agreement for the construction of Wahweap
visitor use facilities under State Lake Improvement Funds
(SLIF).
Memorandum
of
Understanding
Detween
Coconino
County,
Arizona, Sheriff's
Office, and Glen Canyon
National
Recreation Area detailing investigative roles of National
Park Service Commissioned Officers in relationship to State
and local agencies.
Between the State
Recreation Area

of

Arizona

and

Glen

Canyon

National

Memorandum of Agreement with the Arizona Department of
Public Safety and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area for
deputation of Arizona Department of Public Safety personnel
as National Park Service Special Police Officers within Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area.
Memorandum of Understanding with Arizona Department of
Public Safety for use of telecommunications site on Navajo
Mountain by the National Park Service and the use of office
space at the Wahweap Ranger Office by the Arizona Department
of Public Safety.
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Between Samaritan Health Services and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area
Cooperative
Agreement
for emergency
medical
training for National Park Service personnel.

services

Cooperative Agreement for adequate and suitable space for
anv
radio
communications,
recording,
and
biomedical
t^emetry equipment needed for monitoring and/or supervision
of recreation area personnel.
Between Northern Arizona University and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area
Cooperative Agreement to provide a cooperative effort toward
a student-intern program to conduct monitoring and research
programs
on
the
park
and
to
further
educational
opportunities.
Cooperative
Agreement
to
establish
programs with the recreation area.

paleoenvironmental

Between the University of Arizona and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area
Cooperative
Agreement
to
establish
programs with the recreation area.
Between Wayne County,
Recreation Area

Utah,

and

Glen

paleoenvironmental
Canyon

National

Memorandum of Understanding between Wayne County, Utah,
the Sheriff's Office, and Glen Canyon National -Recreation
Area detailing investigative roles of the National Park
Service Commissioned Officers in relationship to State and
local agencies.
Between Bullfrog Resort and Marina, Inc., and Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area
Cooperative Agreement to design, construction, installation,
maintenance, and security of interior exhibits and displays
to be located in the Anasazi Restaurant, Bullfrog Basin,
Utah.
Between Canyonlands National Park and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area
Memorandum of Understanding for mutual coordination of
management activities and information sharing between both
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parks in the Orange Cliffs-Hans Flat area and the lower
Cataract
Canyon-upper Lake Powell area.
Between Navajo Nation and Glen Canyon National Recreation
Area
Interagency
maintenance
personnel.

Agreement
of Navajo

for the repair and preventive
radio equipment by Glen Canyon

82

